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Battle of the Korsun–Cherkassy Pocket
The Korsun–Shevchenkovsky Offensive led to the Battle of the Korsun–Cherkasy Pocket which took place from 24 January to 16 February 1944. The offensive was part of the Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive. In it, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, commanded, respectively, by Nikolai Vatutin and Ivan Konev, trapped German forces of Army Group South in a pocket near the Dnieper River. During weeks of fighting, the two Red Army Fronts tried to eradicate the pocket. The encircled German units broke out in coordination with a relief attempt by other German forces, with "roughly two out of three" encircled men succeeding in escaping the pocket,〔Nash, p. 366〕 "and almost one third of their men ... dead or prisoners."〔Zetterling & Frankson, p. 280〕
The Soviet victory in the Korsun–Shevchenkovsky Offensive marked the successful implementation of Soviet deep operations. Soviet Deep Battle doctrine envisaged the breaking of the enemy's forward defences to allow fresh operational reserves to exploit the breakthrough by driving into the strategic depth of the enemy front. The arrival of large numbers of U.S. and British built trucks and halftracks gave the Soviet forces much greater mobility than they had in the earlier portion of the war. This, coupled with the Soviet capacity to hold large formations in reserve gave the Soviets the ability to drive deep behind German defenses again and again. Though the Soviet operation at Korsun did not result in the collapse in the German front that the Soviet command had hoped for, it marked a significant change in operations. Through the rest of the war the Soviets would place large German forces in jeopardy, while the Germans were stretched thin and constantly attempting to extract themselves from one crisis to the next. Mobile Soviet offensives were the hallmark of the Eastern front for the remainder of the war.
==January 1944==
In the autumn of 1943, the German forces of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South including General Otto Wöhler's 8th Army had fallen back to the Panther–Wotan line, a defensive position that in Ukraine followed the Dnieper river. By 1 December 1943 the line had been broken and the Soviet Army had crossed the Dnieper in force. Only two corps, the XI under Gen. Wilhelm Stemmermann, the XLII Army Corps under Lt.Gen. Theobald Lieb and the attached Corps Detachment B〔Corps Detachment B was organized as an infantry division with six infantry battalions and normal supporting divisional units. The unit had been formed from elements contributed by the 112th, 255th, and 332nd Infantry Divisions. Tessin, pp. 26–27.〕 from the 8th Army were holding a salient in the new Soviet line. The salient to the west of Cherkasy extended some 100 kilometers to the Dnieper river settlement of Kanev, with the town of Korsun roughly in the center of the salient, with the 1st Ukrainian Front to its left and the 2nd Ukrainian Front to its right. Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov realized the potential for destroying Wöhler's 8th Army with the Stalingrad model as precedent and using similar tactics as were applied to defeat Paulus's encircled 6th Army. Zhukov recommended to the Soviet Supreme Command (Stavka) to deploy 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to form two armored rings of encirclement: an inner ring around the pocket followed by destruction of the forces it contained, and an external ring to prevent relief formations from reaching the trapped units. Despite repeated warnings from Manstein and others, Hitler refused to allow the exposed units to be pulled back to safety.
General Konev held a conference at his headquarters at Boltushki on 15 January with his commanders and their political commissars to pass on the orders received from Stavka.〔Zetterling & Frankson, p. 37〕 The initial attack was to be conducted by Konev's own 2nd Ukrainian Front from the southeast by 53rd Army and 4th Guards Army, with 5th Guards Tank Army to exploit penetrations supported by 5th Air Army, to be joined in progress by 52nd Army, 5th Guards Cavalry Corps and 2nd Tank Army. Additionally, from Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front, 27th and 40th Armies were to be deployed from the northwest, with 6th Tank Army to exploit penetrations supported by 2nd Air Army.〔Zetterling & Frankson, pp. 37–39〕 Many of these formations had received an inflow of new personnel. Red Army planning further included extensive deception operations that the Soviets claimed were successful, however, the German 8th Army war diary shows clearly that the German staffs were concerned with the threat at hand.〔Zetterling & Frankson, p. 39〕
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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